Technology transfer with search intensity and project advertising

Giorgio Calcagnini, Germana Giombini, Paolo Liberati and Giuseppe Travaglini

No 1509, Working Papers from University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini

Abstract: TIn this paper we present a model where technology transfer is embedded into a competitive model of utility and profit maximization and is the result of a matching process between heterogeneous Knowledge Transfer Offices (KTOs) and innovative firmrms. Our model improves on previous literature by endogenizing the process that drives the dynamics of university researchers in search and firm vacant projects. We are able to show that the KTOs' reservation fee rate must be greater than the ratio between the marginal researcher cost and the marginal utility of matched projects, and that technology transfer strictly depends on the efficiency units of searching researchers and vacant projects. Further, we show that firm technological progress might be too low when KTOs too much intensively search for project matches. This occurs because both sides of the market ignore the externalities of their decisions. Finally, behavioral complementarity, substitutability, and free riding are all potential equilibrium outcomes.

Keywords: Technology transfer; Matching; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2015, Revised 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-mic, nep-ppm, nep-sbm and nep-upt
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http://www.econ.uniurb.it/RePEc/urb/wpaper/WP_15_09.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Technology transfer with search intensity and project advertising (2019)
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