Competition for Procurement Shares

Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

Keywords: Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica); 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://hdl.handle.net/2072/169682

Related works:
Journal Article: Competition for procurement shares (2013)
Working Paper: Competition for procurement shares (2011)
Working Paper: Competition for Procurement Shares (2011)
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