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A Theory of Representative Behavior in the Dictator Game

Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel) and Osório, António (António Miguel)

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.

Keywords: Disseny d'experiments; Microeconomia; Economia del benestar; Decisió de grup; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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