Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games

Osório, António (António Miguel)

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines different Brownian information structures for varying time intervals. We focus on the non-limit case and on the trade-offs between information quantity and quality to efficiently establish incentives. These two dimensions of information tend to complement each other when signals quality is sufficiently high. Otherwise, information quantity tends to replace information quality. Any conclusion depends crucially on the rate at which information quality improves or decays with respect to the discounting incentives. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Information Quantity, Information Quality.

Keywords: Jocs; Teoria de; Teoria de la informació (Economia); Contractes -- Aspectes econòmics; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/260962

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/260962

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ariadna Casals ().