Searching for the ‘least’ and ‘most’ dictatorial rules

Dezső Bednay (), Anna Moskalenko and Attila Tasnádi

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: We derive a least dictatorial social choice function by specifying a plausible metric above the set of social choice functions. Measuring conformity by counting the number of cases a voter believes to be the dictator, we obtain the plurality rule. Keywords: Voting rules, dictatorship, plurality rule. JEL Classification Number: D71.

Keywords: Elecció social; 32 - Política; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/261532

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