The number of parties and decision making in legislatures

Marina Bannikova (mmbannikova@gmail.com) and Artyom Jelnov

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which have to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist who is interested in a certain outcome of the vote. We show that the ease of manipulating a legislature decision by the lobbyist is increasing with the number of parties. A high threshold leads to fewer parties represented, and consequently, decreases the ease of changing a legislature decision by the lobbyist. On the other hand, a high threshold may cause a misrepresentation of voters. We show that if the threshold is higher that 6%, the impact of the misrepresentation effect becomes significant.

Keywords: Ciències polítiques -- Presa de decisions; Partits polítics; Grups de pressió; 32 - Política (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/266572

Related works:
Journal Article: The Number of Parties and Decision-Making in Legislatures (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/266572

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ariadna Casals (ariadna.casals@urv.cat).