Consistency distinguishes the (weighted) Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division value and the prenucleolus

Pere Calleja and Francesc Llerena Garrés

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate how the main results in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) vary when we replace self consistency by projected consistency or max consistency. As a consequence, we obtain several axiomatic comparison among the (weighted) Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division solution and the prenucleolus.

Keywords: Jocs cooperatius; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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