Strategic Responses to International Tax Competition: Fiscal (De) Centralization versus Partial Tax Harmonization

Patricia Sanz Córdoba and Theilen, Bernd, 1965-

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes a country’s optimal fiscal strategy among centralization, decentralization, and partial tax harmonization. Countries are asymmetric in productivity levels and characterized by multi-level government such that there is both horizontal and vertical tax competition. The main result from the analysis is that partial tax harmonization is more difficult to achieve in fiscally decentralized economies with high levels of productivity and low labor taxation. This result is confirmed by recent data from the OECD and explains the observed difficulties in achieving capital tax harmonization in the European Union. JEL Classification Numbers: F15, F38, H20, H87 Key Words: Centralization; Decentralization; Fiscal Competition; Partial Tax Harmonization.

Keywords: Integració econòmica; Organització de Cooperació i Desenvolupament Econòmic; Països de la -- Política fiscal; Harmonització fiscal; 336 - Finances. Banca. Moneda. Borsa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/306513

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