Weak fairness and the Shapley value

Pere Calleja and Francesc Llerena Garrés

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been axiomatically characterized from different points of view. Van den Brink (2001) proposes a characterization by means of efficiency, fairness and the null player property. In this paper, we characterize the family of single-valued solutions obtained by relaxing fairness into weak fairness. To point out the Shapley value, we impose the additional axiom of weak self consistency and strengthen the null player property into the dummy player property.

Keywords: Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica); 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/306979

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