Economic Laboratory Experiment on Horn's Rule

Kris De Jaegher, Stephanie Rosenkranz and Utz Weitzel

No 08-27, Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a framework for empirically testing several alternative game-theoretic rationales for Horn’s rule. It then presents an economic laboratory experiment where these rationales are empirically tested. Subjects seem to coordinate on Horn’s rule where efficiency acts as a focal point. Nevertheless, a weak interpretation of the evolutionary argument is not rejected: prior play does have an effect on future play. This suggests a hierarchy of effects, where the focal point effect dominates the evolutionary effect, with the latter being more pronounced in cheap talk situations.

Keywords: Horn’s Rule; Signalling Theory; Pragmatics; Economic Laboratory Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:use:tkiwps:0827

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