The Contest for Olympic Succes as a Public Good

Loek Groot

No 08-34, Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: This study considers the performance of countries at the Olympic Games as a public good. Firstly, it is argued that, at the national level, Olympic success meets the two key conditions of a public good: non-rivalry and non-excludability. Secondly, it is demonstrated that standard income inequality measures, such as the Lorenz curve and the Gini index, can be successfully applied to the distribution of Olympic success. The actual distribution of Olympic success is compared with alternative hypothetical distributions, among which according to population shares, the distribution favoured by a social planner and the noncooperating Nash- Cournot distribution. By way of conclusion, a device is proposed to make the distribution of Olympic success more equitable.

Keywords: Olympic Games; public goods; externalities; social welfare; Nash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: The Contest for Olympic Success as a Public Good (2012)
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