Cooperation and the common enemy effect

Kris De Jaegher and B. Hoyer

No 12-24, Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a game-theoretic rationale for the beneficial effect of a common enemy on cooperation. In a defence game against a common natural threat, the value of the public good of defence is equal to the sum of the players’ defensive efforts. The game therefore takes the form of a prisoner’s dilemma, leading to free-riding. When the same defence game is played against a common enemy, the value of the public good of defence is equal to the smallest defensive effort. The game now takes the form of a stag hunt, so that a cooperative equilibrium becomes possible. For this reason, an informed and benevolent government may not want to inform the public that it is facing a common natural threat rather than a common enemy. At the same time, the common enemy has an incentive to mimic nature, and perform only random rather than targeted attacks.

Keywords: Common Enemy Effect; Defence Games; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Stag Hunt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:use:tkiwps:1224

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