Detection of Collusive Networks in E-procurement

Bruno Baranek, L. Musolff and Vítězslav Titl

Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: Collusion likely has adverse effects on social welfare. In this paper, we study collusion in the e-procurement market in Ukraine. We document that the bidding patterns in the data are incompatible with a competitive equilibrium. We develop a novel structural test to detect pairs and, thereby, networks of collusive firms. We validate the soundness of our collusion detection algorithm on a sample of 863 prosecuted collusive firms that participated in 23,515 tenders.

Keywords: Public procurement; Collusion; Online markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law, nep-net and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:use:tkiwps:2111

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