Mixed Matching Markets

Winfried Hochstättler (), Robert Nickel () and David Schiess ()

University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 from Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen

Abstract: We introduce a new model for two-sided markets that generalizes stable marriages as well as assignment games. Our model is a further generalization of the model introduced by Eriksson and Karlander [2]. We prove that the core of our model is always non-empty by providing an algorithm that determines a stable solution in O(n4).

Keywords: stable marriage; assignment game; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
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