First In First Win: Evidence on Unfairness of Round-Robin Tournaments in Mega-Events

Alex Krumer and Michael Lechner

No 1611, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract: The order of actions in contests may have a significant effect on performance. In this study we examine the role of schedule in round-robin tournaments with sequential games between three and four contestants. Our propensity-score matching estimation, based on soccer FIFA World Cups, UEFA European Championships and Olympic wrestling events, reveals that there is a substantial advantage to the contestant who competes in the first and third matches, which is in line with game-theoretical predictions. Our finding implies that the round-robin structure with sequential games is endogenously unfair, since it systematically favours one of the contestants.

Keywords: Performance; schedule effects; soccer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D20 L00 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2016:11

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