Born in the Right Place? Health Ministers, Foreign Aid and Infant Mortality

Philine Widmer () and Noémie Zurlinden ()

No 1911, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract: We conduct a systematic study of favoritism by cabinet members in Africa with continentwide coverage (47 countries). We hand-collect birthplace information for all cabinet members between 2001 and 2014 and provide causal evidence of favoritism by health ministers. First, administrative regions receive more World Bank health aid when a region-born health minister is in office. Second, neonates and infants are less likely to die when the current health minister originates from their region. However, the reduction in mortality is not associated with increased health aid, implying that health ministers' favoritism also occurs through other channels.

Keywords: FForeign aid; favoritism; political capture; patronage; clientelism; aid allocation; Africa; World Bank; infant mortality; child health; georeferenced data; spatial analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 F35 I10 I18 J13 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2019-08, Revised 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-hea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2019:11

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