Does increased teacher accountability decrease leniency in grading?
Patrick Puhani and
Philip Yang
No 1914, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science
Abstract:
Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we assess the effect of introducing centralized scoring standards into schools with higher and lower quality peer groups. We find that implementation of these standards increases scoring differences between the two school types by about 25 percent.
Keywords: Education; gender; identification; fixed effects; teacher quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 J45 J71 J78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-ure
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http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1914.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Does increased teacher accountability decrease leniency in grading? (2020) 
Working Paper: Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading? (2019) 
Working Paper: Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading? (2019) 
Working Paper: Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading? (2019) 
Working Paper: Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading? (2019) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2019:14
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