Quantifying Vote Trading Through Network Reciprocity

Omar Guerrero () and Ulrich Matter ()

No 2106, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract: Building on the concept of reciprocity in directed weighted networks, we propose a framework to study legislative vote trading. We first discuss the conditions to quantify vote trading empirically. We then illustrate how a simple empirical framework—complementary to existing approaches—can facilitate the discovery and measurement of vote trading in roll-call data. The application of the suggested procedure preserves the micro-structure of trades between individual legislators, shedding light on, so far, unstudied aspects of vote trading. Validation is provided via Monte Carlo simulation of the legislative process (with and without vote trading). Applications to two major studies in the field provide richer, yet consistent evidence on vote trading in US politics.

Keywords: Vote trading; roll-call voting; networks; reciprocity; US Congress (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2021:06

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