Belief Formation and Evolution in Public Good Games

Jaromír Kovářík

Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena from University of Siena

Abstract: We analyze first-order beliefs in a variation of the Public Good Game. We show that (1) the role that belief elicitation plays in the experiment affects both the contribution behavior and beliefs, and (2) framing influences stated beliefs, as much as contribution behavior. In the second part of the paper, we study the role of heterogeneity in the formation of initial beliefs, and provide an empirical model of the belief up-dating process. Subjects use the past experience, stressing the role of experience that comes from situations similar to the current ones.

Keywords: Beliefs; Public Good; Framing; Experiment; (Belief) Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 D84 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:labsit:016

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