School Choice and Information. An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms

Joana Pais () and Ágnes Pintér

Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena from University of Siena

Abstract: We present an experimental study where we analyze three well-known matching mechanisms. the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms. in di¤erent informational settings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, suggesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in terms of efficiency and it is slightly more successful than the Gale-Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas manipulation is stronger under the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truth-telling in lack of information about the others. payoffs. ignorance may be beneficial in this context. , the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others.

Keywords: Laboratory; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms (2008)
Working Paper: School Choice and Information An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:labsit:018

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