Group Influence in Sharing Experiments

Daniela Di Cagno, Werner Güth (), Marcello Puca and Patrizia Sbriglia ()

Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena from University of Siena

Abstract: We experimentally study how group identity and social influence affect proposers and recipients in Ultimatum and Impunity Games. To induce group identity and social effects, we assign individuals to different color groups and inform them about the median choice of their own group. When testing the relevance of this social signal for intentions and decisions we distinguish uni- and bi-dimensional behavior, the latter to let individuals select on which rule of conduct of the others to condition own behavior. When disagreement and conflicting views are possible, coordinating with group behavior may be less important and individuals may prefer self-serving. The bi-dimensional design apparently allows for more variety: tracking both group medians, only one or none.Social influence significantly affects behavior in Ultimatum but has much weaker impact in Impunity experiments. Social information seems to act in two ways: as a coordination device and as a learning device. However, the marginal impact of the signal and the direction of its influence is strongly role dependent.

Keywords: ultimatum Game; impunity game; social influence; group identity; fairness; experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:labsit:050

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