Concept Lattices and Convexity of Coalitional Game Forms

Stefano Vannucci ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: The concept lattice of a coalitional game form is introduced and advocated as a structural classificatory tool. The basic properties of such lattices are studied. Sufficient concept-latticial properties for convexity of the underlying coalitional game form are identified. Spectral issues concerning widths and lengths of concept lattices of convex CGFs are also addressed

JEL-codes: C00 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:476

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