Appropriability and Incentives with Complementary Innovations

Massimo D'Antoni and Maria Alessandra Rossi ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: This article analyzes the effects on ex ante incentives to invest in the development of complementary innovations of two alternative appropriability strategies: a strategy of exclusion of third parties from access (through active enforcement of IPRs or technical means) vis-a-vis an openness strategy, i.e. an ex-ante commitment not to exclude. Assuming that the complementary innovations constitute a common input and that agents make complementary investments in its private exploitation, we find that, when complementarities are sufficiently strong, a commitment to openness may provide greater incentives than an exclusion strategy. The theoretical framework is used to provide an interpretation of Open Source Software licenses and the “Open Science” system.

Keywords: incentives to innovation; complementarity; intellectual property rights; open source software; open science. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L17 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
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Related works:
Journal Article: Appropriability and Incentives with Complementary Innovations (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:603

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