Liberalization-Privatization Paths: Policies and Politics

Filippo Belloc () and Antonio Nicita ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: We empirically investigate the political determinants of deregulation policies in six network industries of 30 OECD countries over 1975-2007. We unbundle privatization and liberalization and propose an econometric study in which we allow for the joint adoption of the two policies by governments. We find, contrary to conventional wisdom, that right-wing executives tend to privatize more and to liberalize less, relative to left-wing governments. Thus, we show that ideological cleavages affect the ‘structure’ of deregulation, i.e. the way in which liberalization and privatization are combined. This result may shed new lights on the analysis of the political determinants of market-oriented policy, and suggest new issues for further theoretical and empirical research

Keywords: Liberalization; Privatization; Network Industries; Partisanship. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D72 L50 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme, nep-net, nep-pol and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Liberalization-privatization paths: policies and politics (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:609

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