The Costs of Avoiding Accidents.Selective Compliance and the 'Peltzman Effect' in Italy

Antonio Nicita () and Simona Benedettini ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: We empirically investigate the deterrent and offsetting effects of the introduction of a point–record driving license (PDRL) in Italy. We find that the PDRL resulted in a sharp reduction of seat belt offenses, and in a noticeable decrease of road accidents. However, the reduction in occupant fatalities and injuries was associated with an increase in non-occupant ones, suggesting a remarkable “Peltzman effect”. We then discuss whether a given enforcement design, by inducing drivers to make the best use of safety resources already available to them, may generate more external costs than would otherwise occur.

Keywords: offsetting behavior; point - record driving license; seat belts; traffic law enforcement; traffic fatalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 K32 K42 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-hea and nep-tre
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:631

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