Majority Judgment and Strategy-Proofness

Stefano Vannucci ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: Majority judgment as recently formulated and advo- cated by Balinski and Laraki in their in?uential monograph (Ma- jority Judgment (2010)) is a method to aggregate pro?les of judg- ments which are expressed in a common language consisting of a bounded linearly ordered set of grades. It is shown that major- ity judgment is strategy-proof but not coalitionally strategy-proof on a very comprehensive class of rich single peaked preference do- mains. The proof relies on the key observation that a common bounded linear order of grades makes the set of gradings a prod- uct of bounded chains, which is a special instance of a bounded distributive lattice. As a by-product, we also obtain a character- ization of majority judgment with an odd number of agents by anonymity, bi-idempotence and strategy-proofness on rich single peaked domains.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; bounded distributive lattice; single peakedness; majority rule; majority judgment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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