Clustering of R&D collaboration in Cournot oligopoly

Mauro Caminati ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: This paper complements the Cournot collaboration game outlined in Goyal and Joshi (2003, sect. 4), with the hypothesis that pairwise R&D alliance is constrained by knowledge distance. Potential asymmetry of distance between two knowledge sets is formalized through a quasi-metric in knowldge space. If the knowledge constraints to collaboration are weak enough, the paper replicates the result by Goyal and Joshi (2003, sect. 4), that a ?firm is either isolated, or is connected to every other ?firm in the industry. If absoprtion of ideas from one?s potential partner requires sufficiently high knowledge proximity, the stable R&D networks in Cournot oligopoly are shown to display the clustering property, that is characteristic of real-world industry networks, and of social networks more generally.

Keywords: Cournot collaboration game; directed knowledge distance; R&D networks; degree assortativity; clustering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 L13 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ino, nep-knm, nep-sbm and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:737

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