Symmetric Consequence Relations and Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation

Stefano Vannucci (stefano.vannucci@unisi.it)

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: It is shown that the posets of both substructural and classical symmetric consequence relations ordered by set-inclusion are (non-boolean) completely distributive complete lattices. Therefore, those two basic versions of symmetric consequence relations are amenable to anonymous neutral and idempotent strategy- proof aggregation by majority polynomial rules on single-peaked domains. In particular, the majority rule is characterized as the only aggregation rule for odd profiles of symmetric consequence relations that is anonymous, bi-idempotent and strategy-proof on arbitrary rich locally unimodal domains.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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