DOES FACT-FINDING PROMOTE SETTLEMENT? THEORY AND A TEST

David Dickinson and Lynn Hunnicutt

No 2002-06, Working Papers from Utah State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Some labor negotiations include a break in which a non-binding recommendation is made by a fact-finder as an intermediate dispute resolution procedure. There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether this fact-finding increases or reduces the likelihood of settlement. Inasmuch as fact-finding reduces uncertainty about the outcome, it may “chill” bargaining and increase the need for additional dispute resolution procedures. On the other hand, the fact-finder’s recommendation may give the parties a focal point around which they are able to craft an agreement, thus reducing the incidence of disputes. Which of these effects dominates is a question that we consider using both a theoretical model and data from a controlled experimental bargaining environment.

Keywords: bargaining; experiments; dispute resolution; arbitration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2002-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://repec.bus.usu.edu/RePEc/usu/pdf/ERI2002-06.pdf First version, 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Does Fact-Finding Promote Settlement? Theory and a Test (2005)
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