Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China

John Gilbert and Reza Oladi

No 2011-02, Working Papers from Utah State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider the potential influence of contributions from interest groups to political rivals in the voting behavior of US legislators on international trade policy issues. Our application addresses the determinants of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China decision, and focuses particular attention on the agriculture/agribusiness lobby. A simultaneous voting-net contributions model suggests that these contributions were very effective relative to organized labor and other corporate groups, despite their relatively small dollar value. Possible explanations arising from differences in targeting strategies are explored.

Keywords: Trade policy; agricultural political economy; binary choice models; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2011-01-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-int and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China (2012)
Working Paper: Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China (2011)
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