The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions in Brazil: The Limits of the Inflation Targeting Strategy, 1999-2005

Matías Vernengo

Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah from University of Utah, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper provides a critical analysis of the literature on monetary policy institutions. It presents a critique of the dominant notion of central bank independence, based on the literature on time-inconsistency of monetary policy. An alternative view that emphasizes the role of distributive conflict in establishing monetary policy regimes is developed and used to analyze the Brazilian inflation targeting regime implemented in 1999. The analysis suggests that financial or rentiers interests benefit from the current monetary regime, while manufacturing and workers interests bear the costs.

Keywords: Inflation Targeting; Central Bank Behavior; Distributive Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 F59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-lam, nep-mac, nep-mon, nep-pke and nep-pol
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Published in Review of Political Economy, 20(1), January 2008, 95-110.

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Journal Article: The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions in Brazil: The Limits of the Inflation-targeting Strategy, 1999-2005 (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uta:papers:2006_05

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