The Power of Reasoning: Experimental Evidence
Subhasish Dugar and
Haimanti Bhattacharya
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah from University of Utah, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper presents an experimental investigation of how a systematic variation in the cognitive demands on subjects affects the optimal play. The innovation of this paper is the choice of a game, which we call the Game of Position. This is a two-player zero-sum game characterized by a dominant-strategy solution that involves iterative steps of reasoning. The equilibrium play is independent of mutual beliefs of players; hence inability of a subject to play the dominant-strategy unambiguously implies the failure of human reasoning prowess. We alter the two parameters of the game to vary the cognitive constraints, as represented by these steps of reasoning, on players. Our main substantive conclusion is that the frequency of the dominant-strategy play sharply increases as we limit the cognitive demands on players.
Keywords: Non-cooperative game theory; cognition; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://economics.utah.edu/research/publications/2008_20.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uta:papers:2008_20
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah from University of Utah, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (subhasish.dugar@economics.utah.edu).