Elite Collective Agency and the State

Korkut Alp Erturk

Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah from University of Utah, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination. Elites challenge is to simultaneously deter the state from abusing power while at the same time relying on it to discipline defectors in their midst. The basic insight holds that the credibility of the states threats depends on the cost of carrying them out, which elites can have control over if they can act in tandem. Elites can coordinate in being compliant when the rulers threats serve their collective interest which raises the threats credibility, while lowering that of those they dislike by their coordinated noncompliance making them costly to carry out.

Keywords: elite collective agency; state power; coordination; credible threats; subgame imperfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pke
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uta:papers:2019_04

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