Social Identity and Punishment

Jeffrey Butler, Pierluigi Conzo and Martin Leroch

Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers from University of Turin

Abstract: Third party punishment is crucial for sustaining cooperative behavior. Still, little is known about its determinants. In this paper we use laboratory experiments to investigate a long-conjectured interaction between group identi cation and bystanders' punishment preferences using a novel measure of these preferences. We induce minimal groups and give a bystander the opportunity to punish the perpetrator of an unfair act against a defenseless victim. We elicit the bystander's valuation for punishment in four cases: when the perpetrator, the victim, both or neither are members of the bystander's group. We generate testable predictions about the rank order of punishment valuations from a simple framework incorporating group-contingent preferences for justice which are largely con rmed. Finally, we conduct control sessions where groups are not induced. Comparing punishment across treatment and control suggests that third-party punishers tend to treat others as in-group members unless otherwise divided.

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-hrm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social Identity and Punishment (2015)
Working Paper: Social Identity and Punishment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uto:dipeco:201329

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