A Recursive Value for n -Person Cooperative Games

Hannu Salonen

No 116, Research Reports from University of Turku, Department of Economics

Abstract: Some solution concepts for n -person games admit a recursive definition. In such a recursion, the solution of an n -person game is computed by using the knowledge of how some of the proper subgames of a given game have been solved. While these kind of recursion formulas are of course computational devices, they can also help us to understand the bargaining processes behind various solution concepts. Two recursion formulas leading to the Shapley value are studied in more detail.

Keywords: Shapley value; recursion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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