Arms Trade Offsets: What Do We Know?

Jurgen Brauer and John Dunne

No 910, Working Papers from Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol

Abstract: This chapter is a review of our empirical knowledge regarding arms trade offsets. Extant evidence suggests that offset arrangements do not yield net benefits for a country’s economic development. As a general rule arms trade offset deals are more costly than off-the-shelf arms purchases, create little by way of new or sustainable employment, do not appear to contribute in any substantive way to general economic development, and with very few exceptions do not result in significant technology transfers, not even within the military sector. As of 2009, the United States and the European Union have taken official government positions against offset deals. Nonetheless, arms trade offsets are a flourishing practice.

Keywords: Arms Offsets; defence; arms trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://carecon.org.uk/DPs/0910.pdf First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Arms Trade Offsets: What Do We Know? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwe:wpaper:0910

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