Corruption, Military Spending and Growth

Giorgio d'Agostino, Luca Pieroni and John Dunne

No 1103, Working Papers from Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol

Abstract: This paper considers the complementary effect of corruption and military spending on economic growth, analyzing both the direct impact of public spending and effect of allocating resources between categories of public spending within the framework of an endogenous growth model. The non-linearities that emerge from are the result of the links between the components of public spending, corruption and economic growth. The main findings of the empirical analysis confirm the expectation that corruption and military burden lower the growth rate of GDP per capita. They also suggest that when the the complementarity effect between military spending and corruption is omitted, as in most studies, the impact of military burden on economic performance is underestimated.

Keywords: corruption; military spending; development economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H5 O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-fdg
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://carecon.org.uk/DPs/1103.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: CORRUPTION, MILITARY SPENDING AND GROWTH (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwe:wpaper:1103

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