Rethinking Environmental Federalism in a Warming World

William Shobe and Dallas Burtraw

No 2012-01, Working Papers from Center for Economic and Policy Studies

Abstract: Climate change policy analysis has focused almost exclusively on national policy and even on harmonizing climate policies across countries, implicitly assuming that the harmonization of climate policies at the subnational level would be mandated or guaranteed. We argue that the design and implementation of climate policy in a federal union will diverge in important ways from policy design in a unitary government. National climate policies built on the assumption of a unitary model of governance are unlikely to achieve the expected outcome due to interactions with policy choices made at the subnational level. In a federal system, the information and incentives generated by a national policy must pass through various levels of subnational fiscal and regulatory policy. Effective policy design must recognize both the constraints and opportunities presented by a federal structure of government. Furthermore, policies that take advantage of the federal structure of government can improve climate governance outcomes.

Keywords: climate change; subsidiarity; states; federalism; climate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
Note: Forthcoming in Climate Change Economics
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Climate Change Economics

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Related works:
Journal Article: RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM IN A WARMING WORLD (2012)
Working Paper: Rethinking Environmental Federalism in a Warming World (2012)
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