On Kolm's Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory

John Weymark

No 518, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle" says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be justified by the choices that would have been made in appropriate counterfactual choice situations. Kolm's principle does not identify the relevant counterfactuals. In this article, it is argued that the appropriate counterfactuals to justify an impartial social choice are all of the choice situations that a moral agent behind a veil of ignorance might think is the actual choice situation outside the veil.

Keywords: Arrovian social choice; counterfactual choice; veil of ignorance; impartial observer; universal prescriptivism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B40 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-hpe
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http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu05-w18R.pdf Revised version, 2007 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: On Kolm’s Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0518

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