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Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter

Francis Bloch and Benjamin Zissimos

No 802, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a North-South model of international trade in which (i) there is a relatively small number of countries in the North and (ii) the North is relatively abundant in capital while the South is relatively abundant in labor. Using new methods in monotone comparative statics, the effect of changes in country numbers on the outcome of a "tariff war" is studied. It is shown that terms-of-trade and welfare in the North are greater the larger the number of countries in the South and vice versa. The paper also studies the relationship between the number of countries in the world market and its performance in terms of efficiency. It is shown that, as the world economy is replicated, the equilibrium in a tariff war converges monotonically towards the competitive equilibrium of free trade.

Keywords: Comparative statics; efficiency; North-South; tariff war; terms of trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E2 E6 H2 O4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu08-w02.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter (2009) Downloads
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