Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes

Martin Van der Linden

No 16-00018, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: Many mechanisms used to select a committee of k members out of a candidates endow voters with some veto power over candidates. Impossibility results are provided showing that, in most cases, even limited veto power implies that the mechanism is not strategy-proof. These impossibilities hold on a large set of domains including the domain of additive preferences and even when probabilistic mechanisms are allowed.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Strategy-proofness; Veto; Probabilistic mechanism; Committee selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-16-00018

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