Conundrums for Nonconsequentialists

John Weymark

No 13-00010, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: There are a number of single-profile impossibility theorems in social choice theory and welfare economics that demonstrate the incompatibility of dominance criteria with various nonconsequentialist principles given some rationality restrictions on the rankings being considered. This article is concerned with examining what they have in common and how they differ. Groups of results are identified that have similar formal structures and are established using similar proof strategies.

Keywords: consequentialism; welfarism; social choice; welfare economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Conundrums for nonconsequentialists (2017)
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