Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts Across Congressional Districts

Robert K. Fleck (), Christopher Kilby and Robert K. Fleck
Additional contact information
Robert K. Fleck: Montana State University Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Robert Kenneth Fleck ()

No 44, Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series from Vassar College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between congressional support for foreign aid and the distribution of USAID contract spending across congressional districts within the United States. The extent to which such a relationship matters has become increasingly important in recent years, as the end of the Cold War and the advent of the Republican-controlled Congress have eroded the traditional base of support for foreign aid. We develop a model to illustrate how the distribution of contract spending could be used to increase support for foreign aid, but at the expense of development impact, in effect trading quality for quantity. Data on domestic foreign aid contract spending and votes in the 104th Congress House of Representatives allow us to test if the geographic distribution of USAID contract spending within the United States is consistent with a systematic attempt to build support for foreign aid in Congress. Econometric results provide little evidence of such attempts, apparently because voting on this issue is insensitive to the distribution of contract spending.

Date: 1998-06, Revised 1999-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Southern Economic Journal, January 2001, 67(3):598-617.

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vas:papers:44

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series from Vassar College Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sean Flynn ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).