Re-matching, Information and Sequencing Effects in Posted Offer Markets

Douglas Davis, Oleg Korenok and Robert Reilly

No 701, Working Papers from VCU School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper evaluates the effects of some standard procedural variations on outcomes in posted offer oligopoly experiments. Variations studied include the presence or absence of market information, the use of re-matching or fixed seller pairs and alterations in the order of sequencing. Experimental results indicate that such variations can have first order effects on outcomes. For this reason, we recommend that results in oligopoly experiments be carefully interpreted in light of the procedures selected.

Keywords: Market Experiments; Oligopoly; Re-Matching; Information; Market Concentration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D4 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2007-02, Revised 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Forthcoming in Experimental Economics

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.people.vcu.edu/~dddavis/papers/Rematching/EXEC154R2.pdf Final version, 2007 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Re-matching, information and sequencing effects in posted offer markets (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vcu:wpaper:0701

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