Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way Distortion

Michela Cella () and Federico Etro ()
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Michela Cella: Department of Economics, University Of Milan, Bicocca

No 2010_28, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: We analyze the choice of incentive contracts by oligopolistic firms that compete on the product market. Managers have private information and in the first stage they exert cost reducing effort. In equilibrium the standard "no distortion at the top" property disappears and two way distortions are optimal. We extend our analysis to other informational, contractual and competitive settings.

Keywords: Oligopoly; screening; two way distortion; incentives; RD investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D82 D86 L13 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way distortion (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2010_28

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