Non-cooperative equilibrium with multiple deviators

Dmitry Levando ()
Additional contact information
Dmitry Levando: National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow

No 2016:15, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: The paper suggests a non-cooperative simultaneous game, with a number of potential deviators is a parameter of the game. A definition of the game embeds mechanism design. The game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. The equilibrium encompasses intra and inter group externalities and individual payoffs that make it different from a strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium and some other equilibrium concepts. We offer a non-cooperative stability criterion to describe a robustness of an equilibrium strategy profile to an increase in a number of deviators. The criterium may serve as a way to measure trust for the equilibrium in terms of a number of potential deviators.

Keywords: Non-cooperative; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-ger, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.unive.it/web/fileadmin/user_upload/dip ... SE_levando_15_16.pdf First version, anno (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2016:15

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sassano Sonia ().