Spatial resource wars: A two region example

Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian and Giuseppe Freni

No 2018:07, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-location setup. In order to contrast the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when the player are free to choose where to fish/hunt/extract/harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the three situations in which the regulator: (a) leaves the player free to choose where to harvest; (b) establishes a natural reserve where nobody is allowed to harvest; (c) assigns to each player a specific exclusive location to hunt. We show that when preference parameters dictate a low harvesting intensity, the policies cannot mitigate the overexploitation and in addition they worsen the utilities of the players. Conversely, in a context of harsher harvesting intensity, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing the extinction and also improving the welfare of both players.

Keywords: Spatial harvesting problems; Markov perfect equilibrium; Environmental protection policies; Differential Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C72 Q23 Q28 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.unive.it/web/fileadmin/user_upload/dip ... gian_freni_07_18.pdf First version, anno 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Spatial resource wars: A two region example (2018)
Working Paper: Spatial resource wars: A two region example (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2018:07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sassano Sonia ().