EU Money and Mayors: Does Cohesion Policy affect local electoral outcomes?
Marco Di Cataldo and
Elena Renzullo ()
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Elena Renzullo: Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics
No 2024: 02, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"
Abstract:
The EU Cohesion Policy, with its ability to influence the socio-economic trajectories of European regions and cities, also has the potential to shape the political preferences of citizens. While some evidence exists regarding the impact of EU funds on national electoral outcomes, their role for local elections remains largely unexplored, overlooking the inherently territorial nature of Cohesion Policy and the pivotal role played by local policymakers in its activation and implementation. This study leverages detailed administrative data on European development projects to investigate the impact of EU funds on the political support for local incumbent politicians in Italy. It studies the relationship between the inflow of European funds and the probability of re-election for Italian mayors, considering different project types that reflect the mayors’ ability to attract European funds. The results reveal that Cohesion Policy plays a critical role in shaping local voting behaviours. Larger and more visible projects significantly increase the chances of mayoral re election. Moreover, local contexts characterised by faster growth, where EU projects effectively improve municipal public services, witness the greatest electoral gains for incumbents. These results underscore the importance of the design, visibility, and effectiveness of local development projects in determining the political impact of EU redistributive policies.
Keywords: EU Cohesion Policy; incumbent re-election; political preferences; redistribution; local voting behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H7 I38 R58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eec, nep-eur, nep-pol, nep-ppm, nep-sbm and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2024:02
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