Secret and publicly observable contribution intentions in a public goods experiment

Werner Gueth (), Anastasios Koukoumelis (), Maria Levati and Vincenzo Prete ()
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Werner Gueth: Max Planck Institute of Economics
Anastasios Koukoumelis: Department of Economics (University of Verona)
Vincenzo Prete: Department of Economics (University of Verona)

No 07/2019, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary, over a period of stochastic length, two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the other subjects (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we find that they are affected by player types.

Keywords: Public goods game; Cheap talk communication; Real-time protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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