An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform

Carlo Drago, Roberto Ricciuti and Paolo Santella ()
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Paolo Santella: ESMA

No 11/2015, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects on the Italian directorship network of the corporate governance reform that was introduced in Italy in 2011 to prevent interlocking directorships in the financial sector. Interlocking directorships are important communication channels among companies and may have anticompetitive effect. We apply community detection techniques to the analysis of the networks in 2009 and 2012 to ascertain the effect of the reform. We find that, although the number of interlocking directorships decreases in 2012, the reduction takes place mainly at the periphery of the network whereas the network core is stable, allowing the most connected companies to keep their strategic position.

Keywords: interlocking directorships; corporate governance; community detection; social networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 G34 G38 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-eur and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform (2016)
Working Paper: An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform (2015)
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